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Abstract
We compare the consistency of choices in two methods used to elicit
risk preferences on an aggregate as well as on an individual level. We
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lotteries, as introduced by Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) alternating
with nine decisions using the budget approach introduced by Andreoni
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1 Introduction
Measuring and controlling for risk aversion in laboratory economic experi-
ments is commonplace. However, while the concept of measuring risk aver-
sion - for a given utility function - is relatively straight forward theoretically,
finding the appropriate test for risk attitudes is still discussed extensively in
the literature. In this article we compare results of two methods that can
be used to elicit risk preferences - the popular method by Holt and Laury
(2002, 2005, HL) and a newer approach by Andreoni and Harbaugh (2009,
AH). Both methods are developed to provide data which can be easily inter-
preted in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) framework. Our design,
using each method twice, alternating between methods, allows us to check
for consistency of aggregate-level as well as individual-level measurements of
risk aversion within and between methods. This within-individual bench-
mark makes our paper unique in the literature studying consistency of risk
attitudes. We find that while analysis of aggregate data indicates consis-
tency in behaviour, this evidence is weak on the individual level, both within
methods and between methods.
Why should we care about consistency? In this paper we take the role of
the practitioner who uses elicitation methods to control for risk attitudes of
participants. Hence, we require usable and reasonably robust value estimates
(ex post) based on an (a priori) theoretical framework for which a method
was designed. As such, these estimates should not be too sensitive to small
manipulations in task descriptions and payoffs; and they should consistently
identify risk attitudes - degrees of risk averse, neutral or seeking behaviour -
on an aggregate as well as on the individual level. We perform this analysis
for HL and AH.
A large body of the literature suggests and discusses problems with elic-
itation methods, in particular to connect experimental results to the un-
derlying theoretical models. These problems have been acknowledged by
adopting empirical strategies, in particular by using utility functions that in-
corporate stochastic elements affecting individual choices (e.g., Loomes and
Sugden, 1995, 1998; Loomes et al., 2002), by allowing for effects of inter-
dependence between choices and the choice options presented (Starmer and
Sugden, 1993), or capturing explicitly the idea of heterogeneity of players
(Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997). Unfortunately this literature - despite its in-
sightful considerations - does not provide an implementable toolkit for the
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elicitation of risk attitudes in laboratory experiments.
Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008)’s survey addresses the practical issue of
risk elicitation reviewing different risk elicitation methods and discussing
ways used to estimate risk attitudes. This review compares different elicita-
tion methods and discusses specific characteristics of the methods. It focuses
on comparing (cross-sectional) group aggregated data and does not compare
differences in elicitation methods on an individual or participant level. One
reason for this might be that several studies have found that individuals as
well as group aggregates (like averages) show that different elicitation meth-
ods yield different measures:1
Isaac and James (2000) compare implied risk attitudes of 34 subjects that
resulted out of choices made in a first price auction to measurements based on
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure,2 finding that experimental
choices in the auction cannot be aligned to risk attitudes based on the BDM
procedure. Their results indicate that the two methods only weakly keep the
order in the measures of risk aversion, and that the methods are not just
shifters of risk aversion measures within individuals. Ranked correlations
(across individuals) are only around 39%.
We add to this literature on within-subject consistency of risk elicita-
tion.3 Several studies have found that risk attitudes are not stable within
individuals in experimental settings: Berg et al. (2005) found that implied
risk attitudes depend on whether individual decisions are measured using
auctions for a risky or a riskless asset. Hey et al. (2009) compared willingness-
to-pay, willingness-to-accept, BDM measures and choices over pairwise lot-
1To our understanding Isaac and James (2000) published the first study addressing
this, and subsequent papers, as outlined in more detail below, included further elicitation
methods and investigated further aspects of this original finding.
2This procedure elicits certainty equivalents of given lotteries.
3When talking about consistency in this paper we refer to the ability of a method
to provide with reliable measures in the context of the theoretical framework for which
the method was designed. Hence, an individual would not always have to make identical
choices when repeatedly presented with the same choice options, but only be required to
make choices which imply a similar -ideally the same- conclusion about the risk attitude
of this individual.
It may be argued that elicited choices can also be analysed using other methods; while
we analyse our data in an expected utility (EUT) framework, it may also be used to
make statements in non-EUT frameworks. We will, however, stay in EUT realms for the
purposes of this study. An example of within-individual comparisons in the context of risk
attitudes in a non-EUT framework can be found in Harbaugh et al. (2010).
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teries, finding inconsistencies and in some cases even negative correlations
between results of the different methods within individuals. Anderson and
Mellor (2009) compare results of the method developed by HL and survey
results on gambles (over job and investment choices), finding that except for
a small fraction of superconsistent (“consistently consistent”, p.152) decision
makers, the methods did not provide consistent within-individual estimates
of risk attitudes. Comparing HL results and decisions in a choice setting they
refer to as the “Deal or No Deal game”(named after a popular TV show),
Deck et al. (2008) find that decisions are not consistent and conclude that
one elicitation method is treated as an investment (HL), while the other as
a gambling decision.
When understanding risk attitudes as some (stable) personal characteris-
tic, one can also question if risk attitudes remain constant over time. Harrison
et al. (2005a) and Andersen et al. (2008) investigate temporal stability of risk
attitudes using HL. They argue for temporal stability given their results, al-
though subjects do not necessarily make the same choice over over a 6 month
and 17 month period, respectively. The reason for this is that they attribute
changes in decisions to order effects (Harrison et al., 2005a) and to the fact
that there is no shift in the distribution of risk attitudes over time (Ander-
sen et al., 2008). Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2011) also look at intertemporal stability
using HL and a survey; their results indicate that the assumption of stability
is problematic and that the predictive power of implied risk attitudes based
on HL and decisions in the trust game is low.
Each of these studies compare the results from one risk elicitation method
with the results from another choice setting (like an auction, a trust game,
a game show or a survey) in which choices are also likely to be driven by
risk attitudes. Our approach differs from this literature by comparing the
results of two risk elicitation methods (each applied twice) to measure choice
stability over a short time frame within individual and within method (as
opposed to the long time frame as in Harrison et al. (2005a)). Additionally,
we investigate aggregate and individual cross-method consistency using two
methods of risk elicitation that have the same theoretical starting point but
employ different procedures.
Closest to our study is Dave et al. (2010, in a study on a cross-section
of the Canadian population), who also compare the results of two methods,
HL and an approach by Eckel and Grossman (EG, 2002). They find that
implied risk attitudes of the two methods differ (in the EG method more
individuals are risk neutral) and that HL leads to more inconsistent choices,
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particularly among individuals with lower mathematical skills.4 Our paper
differs to their approach not only in our second elicitation method, but also
by the fact that we have a more homogeneous (student) population as our
experimental subjects (see supplementary material). In the study by Dave
et al. (2010) this mattered for their result, as mathematical skills which were
widely distributed across their experimental subjects, changed the accuracy
of measures between methods. Furthermore, our approach of letting subjects
make decisions for both methods twice provides us with an internal bench-
mark when comparing results across methods.5 Additionally, our methods
of choice are based on the same decision variable used to determine risk atti-
tudes (an optimal probability over gains, see the description of the methods
below for more detail); furthermore, both methods were designed with the
same theoretical framework (i.e., utility function) in mind. This reduces two
potential reasons for why different methods might provide different results
on risk attitudes for an individual.
We find (a) that both methods provide a divergent picture of the overall
risk attitude of the groups in our subject pool, hence whether subjects are
predominately risk neutral or risk averse depends on the elicitation method;
(b) that within-subject consistency of individual decisions throughout the
experiment is limited for both methods, even within methods and (c) that
individual-level consistency decreases further when comparing the two meth-
ods. These results confirm outcomes of prior research and call into ques-
tion how experimental results on risk attitudes can be used for more than
general statements about groups of subjects. The observation of limited
cross-method consistency is further aggravated considering that the internal
consistency is not much better within than across methods. That is, the
problem does not only seem to be that measures depend on framing. Hence,
both methods fall short of some main criteria we would have seen as desirable.
We proceed by introducing the methods we used for our analysis and
4Two further studies looking at differences in elicited risk attitudes among non-students
are Reynaud and Couture (2012) and Charness and Viceisza (2011).
5Bruner (2009) compares risk attitude results when changing the probability of the oc-
currence of a fixed outcome to results with a fixed probability and changing the outcomes
between choices. He then compares the consistency of the method in a statistical estima-
tion over all participants. In our study we always remain on the individual level in our
data analysis, assuming heterogeneity in risk attitudes across individuals and interpreting
all choices as informing about the risk attitude of the specific individual who made the
choice.
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describe the experimental procedure. Section 3 contains an analysis on the
aggregate level and section 4 the within-subject analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Methods and Procedures
In our experiment we used the methods by HL and AH. Both methods are
based on the idea that they provide good measures for a CRRA utility func-
tion and the underlying idea of stable individual risk attitudes.6 They ask
experimental participants to make choices over lotteries where the main deci-
sion variable is the probability of winning; they both allow relatively straight
forward calculations of risk aversion parameters; and they are both labora-
tory specific and can be incentivised similarly, which increases the compara-
bility of data collected. We incentivised (ex post randomly) selected rounds
of both methods such that they yield the same expected value for a risk-
neutral decision maker. This further increases the comparability between
the methods.
We briefly outline the two approaches as we implemented them. The
original papers contain full details and screenshots can be found in the sup-
plementary material.
2.1 Holt and Laury’s Method
HL consists of a menu of lotteries (or multiple price list, MPL) with changing
probabilities over 10 constant pairs of outcomes. For each pair of outcomes
in the list there is a more and a less risky option (based on the variance of
outcomes). Participants were able to see an MPL and were asked to make
choices separately for each row between a pair of lotteries. For each further
decision row down, the probability mass on the higher payoff increased by
10%, making the safer option A (i.e., the option with a lower variance in pay-
offs) less attractive. We deviate from HL slightly by leaving out the certain
option (i.e., 100% probability of the higher payoff) to avoid any reference
point of safety. This reduced our number of choices from 10 to 9 in each
round where we use HL. Over the two rounds we played one set-up in which
6Generally, both methods can also be informative in frameworks that do not assume
CRRA. In the CRRA framework HL and AH are well comparable. We limit our analysis on
CRRA here. Other theoretical frameworks as a basis of comparison might be interesting,
but beyond the scope of this paper.
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participants played over slightly higher stakes (a gamble between 10 and 8 vs.
a gamble between 19.25 and 0.5) and one in which they played over slightly
lower stakes (8 and 6.4 vs. 15.4 and 0.4). The higher stake set-up just scaled
up payoffs and therefore implies slightly higher risk premia for choosing the
more secure option. However, the estimated bounds for CRRA coefficients
remains the same for each number of safe choices.7 Table 1 provides an
example for the set-up with the slightly lower stakes.
Table 1: Multiple price list design by Holt and Laury
Option A Option B
p X 1-p Y p X 1-p Y
0.1 8 0.9 6.4 0.1 15.4 0.9 0.4
0.2 8 0.8 6.4 0.2 15.4 0.8 0.4
0.3 8 0.7 6.4 0.3 15.4 0.7 0.4
0.4 8 0.6 6.4 0.4 15.4 0.6 0.4
0.5 8 0.5 6.4 0.5 15.4 0.5 0.4
0.6 8 0.4 6.4 0.6 15.4 0.4 0.4
0.7 8 0.3 6.4 0.7 15.4 0.3 0.4
0.8 8 0.2 6.4 0.8 15.4 0.2 0.4
0.9 8 0.1 6.4 0.9 15.4 0.1 0.4
Individuals are asked to chose between Option A or B for each row.
2.2 Andreoni and Harbaugh’s Method
In AH individuals have to trade off the probability of winning against the
amount they can win in a gamble; they allocate a budget (or convex risk
budget, CRB) in each decision on the probability (p) of winning and the
amount to be won (x) - with the inverse probability (1− p) individuals get a
payoff of zero. Individuals receive a budget b which they can use to buy extra
percentage points of winning at a price or exchange rate (e) per percentage
point. Hence, individuals choose a pair (p, x) such that x = b− p · e.
7In their study, HL find that subjects are generally risk averse and that risk aversion
increases with the size of the stakes, a statement they refined in a second study (Holt and
Laury, 2005) after a comment by Harrison et al. (2005b). Both payoffs in our study are
close to the low payoff treatment in HL; however, we might observe a small increase in
risk attitudes over the two rounds.
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As the method of AH is less common we give the following example here:
In round D the participant starts with a budget of $88. The participant
can buy extra probability of winning at the cost of $2.75 for each percentage
point of winning. She could, for example, chose to buy 10 percentage points
at a cost of 10·$2.75 = $27.5. Consequently she would get $88 − $27.5 =
$60.5 with a corresponding probability of p = 10% and $0 otherwise (with
1 − p = 90%). The participant can continue to buy further winning proba-
bility, or reduce the winning probability and get a higher amount in case of
winning. The participant will (move the slider and) adjust her combination
of probability and amount won until some optimal point is reached.
AH vary the range of potential winning gains (b) as well as the price e
between additional gains and additional probability of winning . We im-
plemented the AH method with the deviation that we did not use lotteries
involving losses. As in the original paper we presented the probability of
winning as a green shaded area in a pie chart. The amount received in case
of winning was illustrated as a green shaded area in a bar chart. Participants
were able to change the probability of winning by moving a slider. While the
gamble was graphically presented on the computer screen, the probability
of winning and the amount to be won were also stated as numbers on the
screen. Table 2 shows the budgets b (hence the maximum amount that could
be won with probability zero) in each round as well as the price e of one extra
percentage probability of winning. These combinations were each presented
to participants twice.
Table 2: Pairs of maximum gain and cost of probability
Round A B C D E F G H I
Budget (b) 27.3 56 172 88 49.4 39.2 54.5 207 116
Price (e) of 1
extra percent of
winning probability
0.28 1.17 10.75 2.75 0.77 0.41 0.68 8.62 2.42
Individuals chose over p, facing the constraint that they will receive b− p · e with
probability p.
8
2.3 Experimental Design
We used a within-subject design of individuals that make choices based on the
risk elicitation methods introduced by HL and AH. We analysed decisions of
78 experimental participants from a regular student population throughout
7 sessions. Participants were recruited online from the experimental subject
pool at the Queensland University of Technology using ORSEE (Greiner,
2004) and through announcements in tutorials. Some participants were also
recruited in common places at the university in personal communication;
however, when asking students in person for participating in the experi-
ment, the same information was used for recruitment, including the organ-
iser (researchers at the School of Economics and Finance), average earnings
(around 20 Australian dollars) and time estimated to complete the exper-
iment (around 30 minutes). It was also pointed out to the students that
there would be no minimum payment for participating in the experiment.
It is worth noting that this recruitment of asking students personally to
participate was somewhat less controlled than common in many economic
experiments. However, as we were interested in within-subject comparisons
and were still drawing from a relatively homogeneous student population,
this was of minor concern.
The risk elicitation methods were implemented in a computer laboratory
using a custom-made, java-based software. Upon arrival at the laboratory
participants were seated at computers, were asked to work through experi-
mental instructions and start the experiment. Instructions included examples
of how to make choices in the experiment and two test questions for each risk
elicitation method. Further help by the experimenter was available upon re-
quest of participants. When participants had passed the test questions, they
started the experiment, going through two rounds of 9 choices for each risk
elicitation method, alternating between the methods. The order of the risk
elicitation methods was switched for about half of our experimental sessions
(we did not find significant order effects across participant’s decisions de-
pending on the order of the methods).
In order to avoid portfolio-building or wealth effects in the course of the
experiment, after completing the experiment, one of the two rounds was
randomly chosen for payment. For this round one choice of each method
was randomly selected. Thus, for each method one out of 18 decisions was
payment-relevant. For the two choices that were selected, participants were
given the opportunity to change their earlier decisions; we did so in order to
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test whether participants, once they knew that this decision would be paid,
would change their decisions.8 Furthermore, the changes in decisions also
provide an indicator on the reliability of previously recorded choices over
(potentially) hypothetical stakes. Finally, participants were given a ques-
tionnaire that asked for some demographic information and student status.
After students had finished the questionnaire they were paid and could leave
the computer laboratory. Average payments were $17 (SD $18) Australian
dollars, of which $10 (SD $5) were paid for decisions in HL and $7 (SD $17)
for decisions in AH.
3 Replication of results and analysis of ag-
gregate decisions
In a first step we replicated some of the (central) results in the approaches by
HL and AH that were relevant for our comparison. Both papers considered
deriving parameter estimates for a CRRA utility function of the form U(x)
= x
1−r
1−r , as introduced in HL or similarly U(x) = x
α as in AH. As both
notations are equivalent for our purpose, we only report values for α. In
both methods the probability chosen was the main choice variable of interest
for the analysis. For this utility function, HL grouped experimental decision
makers into categories of individuals with a certain risk attitude, based on the
estimated coefficient α. Although the method used by HL does not allow to
directly calculate such a coefficient, bounds of it can be determined by looking
at the switching points from more risky to less risky choices. These bounds
are, however, difficult to identify if individuals have more than one switching
point. Dealing with these issues, HL counted the number of safe choices that
an individual had made and grouped individuals into categories that this
number of safe choices would have implied if they had only a single switching
point (SSP). Table 3 reports our replicated results for our two payoff set-ups
comparable to the low stakes set-up of HL, as well as the original results in
HL in their two treatments with low and high monetary payoffs. The last
8Participants were informed about the random selection mechanism of the 2 choices
at the beginning of the experiment, but were not informed that they would be allowed
to change their choices for these two decisions at the end of the experiment. We follow
Andreoni and Harbaugh (2009, p.12) in this step and address implications of this in the
discussion of our results.
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column contains the empirical distribution of CRRA coefficients based on
our AH data to allow a comparison.
Table 3: Overall distribution of risk attitudes
Risk attitude
Number HL (repl.) HL (2002) AH
of safe (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
choices
Highly risk loving 0-1 α > 1.95 1% 1% 1% 1% 5%
Very risk loving 2 1.95 > α > 1.49 0% 7% 1% 1% 2%
Risk loving 3 1.49 > α > 1.15 8% 5% 6% 4% 6%
Risk neutral 4 1.15 > α > .85 29% 21% 26% 13% 61%
Slightly risk averse 5 .85 > α > .59 17% 23% 26% 19% 11%
Risk averse 6 .59 > α > .32 22% 19% 23% 23% 9%
Very risk averse 7 .32 > α > .03 10% 22% 13% 22% 4%
Highly risk averse 8 .03 > α > −.37 4% 4% 3% 11% 2%
Stay in bed 9-10 −.37 > α 9% 4% 1% 6% 0%
The table shows the share of decisions that would be classified in risk categories
as proposed by HL. We include our replicated HL results (1) and (2), the results
from HL’s original (2002) paper (3) and (4), as well as results implied by our data
about the AH method (5). Our stakes are higher in (2) than in (1), but both
correspond to the low stakes treatment (3) in HL’s original approach, as they are
significantly lower than in HL’s high stakes treatment (4).
The AH risk elicitation method allows for a straightforward calculation of
CRRA coefficients under the functional form as described above; we do this
for each decision that experimental participants take and report the distribu-
tion of all the decisions by all participants based on the implied α-coefficient.9
We do not replicate the full analysis by AH, who answer five questions on ex-
pected utility.10 Instead we focus on whether using a CRRA framework with
a simple utility function as characterised before is reasonable. We confirm
9Given that in AH U(x; p) = p · xα and x = b − e · p, argmaxp U(x; p) =argmaxp
ln[U(x; p)] = be·(α+1) , where b is the maximum gain in a period that can be chosen with a
corresponding probability of zero. As b and e are known, for a chosen p we can calculate
α = be·p − 1, which corresponds to r = 1− α.
10For example, AH investigate if participants violate the generalised axiom of revealed
preference (GARP). They find that in the domain of gains (which corresponds to our
approach) GARP violations are not too frequent (65% of participants show no violations
and 85% two or less violations over 14 budgets). For our participants we observe slightly
more violations (45% and 57% of participants do not violate GARP in the first and second
round of AH, respectively). The number of violations decreases in the second round and
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their regression results over all decisions showing that budget allocations of
the winning probability and the winning price are approximately constant
over the size of winning stakes. As AH we find very small standard errors
in the regression results and negligibly small coefficients. This indicates that
CRRA is a reasonable assumption.
We find that the classification in terms of risk attitudes of our subject
pool when using the HL method follows a similar distribution to the one
reported by HL in their original contribution. Furthermore, we can generally
identify a noticeable degree of risk aversion in our subject pool and also find
a tendency of (slightly) increasing risk aversion when the stakes over which
the lotteries are played increase. Although our stakes are always close to the
lower stake set-up of HL, slightly increasing the stakes shifts the results in
the expected direction.
Harrison et al. (2005b) pointed out that order effects may influence the
results, leading to higher risk aversion in the second round. This may affect
our results and explain different levels of risk-taking between the two rounds.
However, we assume that the effect will be similar across subjects and should
not change the rank order of participants based on their risk attitudes. For
this reason we use rank correlations in our analysis.
Using AH’s method we find that coefficients provide results that indicate
a higher number of risk neutral choices compared to results in HL, some risk
averse choices as well as some decisions that are risk loving. Analysing the
total distribution of the results indicates that the two methods, despite draw-
ing on a very similar notion of utility functions and both being theoretically
legitimate risk elicitation procedures, do not provide with the same result.
The average risk attitude in HL is between slightly risk averse and risk averse
(on average 5.44 safe choices are made), while the average decision in AH is
risk neutral (with a tendency towards risk aversion). This is true despite the
fact that the expected monetary payoff is the same across methods, as on
expected value terms the same amount can be earned in both methods.
4 Analysis of individual decisions
In order to get a better understanding of these differences in the results, we
analysed the decisions of our participants on a within-subject basis. That
we observe less than 10% of individuals violating GARP when allowing for “small errors”as
described in AH. Table 2 in the Supporting Information documents the GARP violations.
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is, since all of our participants made 18 decisions in each method, we can
analyse in how far each individual decided consistently within and across the
two methods.
4.1 Internal consistency of the methods
In a first step we analysed in how far individual participants made consistent
decisions within one risk elicitation method. For this, we used correlations
of individual decisions over the two rounds. For the HL method, the number
of safe choices made in the first and the second period, which were used to
calculate CRRA coefficients as shown in Table 3, gave a correlation of 55%
and a ranked (Spearman’s ρ) correlation of 62%. We also considered a second
way to measure the degree of risk aversion for which we did not assume that
participants have a clearly determinable SSP, but calculated the average risk
premium within their farthest switching points. (This corresponds to an
approach described by Andersen et al. 2006 who are, however, critical about
this procedure.) These averages were correlated at a level of 68% (ρ=69%)
over the two rounds of HL. Figure 2 in the supplementary material also
provides a picture of the dispersion of the difference between safe choices in
the first round (over lower stakes) and the second round (over higher stakes),
indicating that there is a slight shift towards risk aversion, but that it is not
a one-directional shift.
As in the HL method the idea of a SSP from less to more risky options
is important, we also looked at whether assuming the general prevalence of
SSP was reasonable for our sample, and how many of the participants with
SSP consistently chose the same number of safe choices over the two rounds.
From our 78 participants in the experiment, 48 had a SSP in both rounds of
the HL method.11 Of these, 22 chose the same number of safe choices in both
periods.12 Of the 22 (HL-consistent) individuals, 10 participants were in the
risk neutral category as introduced above and 12 were either risk averse or
risk loving.
11The rate of individuals that had more than one switching point in our study is com-
paratively high, at least when compared to the other studies mentioned in the introduction
that used the HL method; they reported non-consistent individuals and non-SSP individ-
uals with shares between 2% and 9% of the sample. Our single round rate is higher than
this and our rate is further increased as we played the HL game over two rounds.
12One of them changed the decision when being able to reconsider their choice at the
end of the experiment.
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When asked to reconsider their choices knowing the period that is going
to be paid, 8 out of 78 participants wanted to change their decision. One of
these 8 increased the number of safe choices, while all others increased the
number of risky choices. Hence, this indicates that generally participants
were fine with the choices they had made earlier. In order to get a better
understanding of which individuals switched their decisions, we investigated
if they differed in some way from the other participants. However, we found
no noticeable correlation with respect to gender, age, their estimated risk
attitude or their mother language. There was also no order effect of which
method was played first or if the choice that could be reconsidered had just
been made in the round before. There was only some small correlation (of
13%) showing that individuals were somewhat more likely to change deci-
sions around the risk neutral switching point. Hence, there is no observable
explanation why individuals changed their decisions in HL.
To analyse the internal consistency in the AH set-up, we similarly first
looked at correlations between decisions of individuals made between the
rounds. For this purpose we calculated implied CRRA α-coefficients for each
decision as described in footnote 9. These coefficients showed correlations
that ranged between 15% and 60% for the same lottery (i.e., the same choice
over a corresponding maximum gain and price of an extra probability of
winning) over the two rounds. Ranked correlations were between 30% and
57% across individuals indicating that looking at only ordinal risk attitudes
of individuals lowered the effect of outliers, but did not lead to a greater
consistency over the rounds.13 There was no apparent relationship between
the stake of the lottery (b) and the correlation between the two rounds; that
is, it was not clear how to identify which factors led to higher consistency
over the rounds. We looked at correlations both for the raw decision variable
(i.e., the probability chosen in a given period) as well as for the implied α-
coefficients for each round of the game. Figures 1 a and b illustrate these
correlations for each round. As can be seen, for all combinations of b and e
a positive relationship exists, but correlations are far from perfect.
In a second step we therefore tried to find an individual aggregate for the
CRRA coefficient over the different CRB choice allocations. We did so by
13The correlations of α-coefficients understates the correlation of probabilities chosen
over the 2 rounds, as small differences in probabilities chosen over the rounds that are far
away from the risk neutral choice optimum are amplified. Hence, for comparison we also
looked at the probabilities chosen over the rounds; these are correlated between 40% and
63%.
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Figure 1: Correlations of decisions over two rounds of AH
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(b) Correlations of α-coefficients
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The figure shows the correspondence of the choices made over the two rounds of
the AH method with each point representing the choices of one participant. the
first round of AH is represented on the x-axis and the second round of AH on the
y-axis. The stakes and price(p) can be mapped with the overview in table 2.
averaging the coefficients for each individual over each round.14 In order to
14AH determine α by using OLS regressions in which α is an estimated parameter.
15
find out if such an aggregation was appropriate, we tested for whether there
was a positive or negative relationship between the maximum gain and the
implied CRRA coefficient. We found that it did not for most individuals.15
Having done this aggregation, we compared (round) average α-values of
the two rounds; they showed a correlation of 70% by individual and a ranked
correlation of 72%. In order to get a better picture of robustness of the
CRRA coefficients, we also looked at whether participants changed their
decisions when being informed that a certain round would be selected for
final payoff. The result showed that – comparatively to the HL method –
many participants (a total of 27) changed their choices. However, changing
decisions in HL and AH can have a very different leverage and the two are
hence not directly comparable. In AH comparatively small changes can be
made by adjusting the budget allocation just a little bit while changing in
HL essentially always implies a significant shift in measured risk attitudes.
Furthermore, in AH the percentage change of those individuals that revised
their decisions was noticeable; on average, participants that changed their
choices moved 12% towards safer choices and absolute changes were 30%.16
Again, as for the HL method we investigated potential reasons for chang-
ing decisions. We found some variables that are correlated with decision
changes in the AH method. Non-native speakers are more likely to make
changes (correlation of 24%), indicating that understanding the task might
Doing so for our data leads to more dispersed α-values than the α-values we calculate by
averaging. The statistical fit in the estimations is high (average R2=70%). OLS-based and
average-based values are strongly correlated (r=63%, ρ=69%). Both simple and ranked
correlations of the OLS-based α-values with HL decisions (as described later) are lower
that the α-values based on averaging. As our main aim is to compare AH and HL and as
we are aiming to be favourable to consistency, we have chosen averaged values here.
15The Supporting Information includes more detail why we concluded that using the
average is appropriate although we found a relationship between b and α for some indi-
viduals.
16Hence, this result indicates that most participants (65%) made their best-informed
choice before. Those that do change, however, often made large changes; 34 of them made
changes of 17% or more and numerous changes are at the rate of 40% or more. Here, but
also for the HL method, this raises the question if revised choices are “better”in their cross-
method stability. We tested these later (the revised) specifications, but found no further
improvement of consistency with previous choices (i.e., individuals that made changes did
not only do so when they were able to alter an outlier. We therefore treated all participants
(changers and non-changers) the same by using their original choices. However, we consider
the fact that we observe switching as a further indication of problematic consistency within
the methods.
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play a role. Age and gender, however, play no role. Furthermore, individuals
with higher values of α are less likely to change their choices (correlation of
22%). However, these relationships do not seem to be strong. Individuals
who change their HL choice are not more likely to do so for their AH choice
as well.
Finally, we investigated in how far using average CRRA coefficients de-
rived using the AH method allowed us to reliably classify participants into
broad categories of risk averse, risk neutral and risk loving individuals. We
therefore tested whether the average CRRA coefficient α was significantly
different from one using confidence intervals of 2 within-subject standard
deviations. We found that only for 5 participants out of the 78 the CRRA
coefficient α was significantly different from one; from our estimates these 5
participants were risk averse and all other participants were approximately
risk neutral.17
4.2 Comparison across methods
Our data also allows us to compare the two risk elicitation methods on a
within-individual basis. One way to do so is trying to make predictions
based on one method of how an individual would have made decisions in the
other method. Following this rationale, we used the average risk aversion
coefficient derived using the AH method to predict how an individual with
this parameter would have decided in the HL framework.
We found that this would have predicted 76% and 75% of decisions in the
two rounds of the HL method, respectively. However, in this comparison any
individual that has multiple switching points (MSP) will have some incorrect
predictions, even if both methods estimate the same coefficient. To alleviate
this effect, we looked at individuals with SSP only, which showed 83% and
82% correct predictions for single (rows of binary) HL choices (hence not the
overall implied risk attitude) over the two periods. These numbers indicate
a high level of comparability.
However, we read these numbers with care. The reason for this is that we
used AH to determine individual-specific risk attitudes and then predicted
choices in HL. A simple benchmark is hence to assume all participants hav-
ing the same risk attitude and see how well this counterfactual can predict
17The main reason for this is that for almost all participants the estimated standard
deviation on α is SD ≥ 0.3 (see supplementary material).
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choices made in HL. We did so by assuming all individuals to be risk neutral.
This should bias the comparison to the favour of the AH method as aggregate
analysis for both methods indicates risk aversion. We found that assuming
these risk neutral participants would have predicted choices made by individ-
uals under the HL method equally well (85% and 82%, respectively). Hence,
our individual-specific estimates do not outperform the counterfactual.
We therefore reverted to the categorisation of participants into groups of
people with different risk attitudes as in Table 3. We allocated individuals
into these risk categories according to the two methods. Using this approach,
10% of participants were grouped into the same risk attitude category by
both methods. The main reason for this is that the AH method (on average)
classifies individuals as more risk neutral than the HL method. In this sense
one could say the AH method “shifts”behaviour of individuals towards risk
neutrality. We observe an average shift of 27%; however, the shift is not
only in one direction (the average absolute shift is about 33%) and when
looking at the ranked correlation on allocations to risk categories ρ is 38%.18
This is surprisingly close to what Isaac and James (2000) found in their
paper comparing risk attitudes of individuals using a first-price auction and
the BDM procedure, which was the first approach comparing two elicitation
methods on an individual level. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship.
5 Conclusion
Using the risk elicitation methods developed by HL and AH, we tested their
internal and external consistency across and within individuals. We find
correlations of about 60% to 70% between decisions in the two periods within
method and within individual. Comparatively, cross-method predictions and
correlations were smaller and can only be established on an aggregate level.
Hence, the two methods are not procedurally invariant, both over the full
subject pool (as visible in Table 3), as well as on an individual level. However,
as low cross-method correlations are also due to low witin-method consistency
of decisions, as visible in our within-method benchmark, ρ = 38% between
the methods is not so little. Evidently one would like to have risk elicitation
methods with more consistency.
18The AH method allows for finer grains than the 6 risk categories which HL identified
in their paper. Using these finer measures for the rank correlation analysis gives ρ=36%.
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Figure 2: Allocation of individuals into risk categories by HL and AH
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The number of individuals at a point is indicated by the size of the bubble.
The line displays a corresponding linear fit.
This result of low cross-method consistency seems undesirable considering
that a priori one would have guessed that the two methods would yield
similar results and it seems difficult to determine a better method ex post.
The difference of a priori compatibility and ex post divergence of the methods
can also not be resolved empirically given our data, as no observable variable
explains the difference. Any reasoning seems highly speculative given that
the two methods have the same theoretical motivation and the same decision
variable, as in both methods individuals choose over probabilities.19
Also the comparison between methods did not provide an unambiguous
19For example, one could speculate that we did not sufficiently explain the tasks, leading
to higher inconsistencies. However, we used relatively standard instructions, included test
questions and supported participants when they had questions. Any protocol effects are
hence unintentional. Another conjecture could be that presenting the full choice list for
HL at once in contrast to presenting choices sequentially in AH might have an influence on
decisions. Or generally, the cognitive load in the tasks may play a role in consistency (as in
Harbaugh et al., 2010). However, one would prefer a method with desirable characteristics
to be robust to such small changes. Particularly as presenting HL choices sequentially
would be likely to further decrease within-individual consistency.
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guideline of which method should be preferred as both are subject to incon-
sistencies. While individuals were more consistent over the two rounds in
the HL method than the AH method, for both it is problematic to clearly
identify the risk attitude of an individual. In both methods we are not de-
scribing small errors as inconsistencies, but shifters that are crucial for the
interpretation and meaningfulness of estimated coefficients. This conclusion
remains despite the fact we only repeated the tasks over two rounds and
increasing the number of repetitions might lead to more inconsistencies. The
analysis of the HL method can be improved by disregarding or simplifying
inconsistent choices, but this might not be advisable, as Jacobson and Petrie
(2009) have shown. We also find few superconsistent individuals (as did An-
derson and Mellor, 2009); in our subject pool individual inconsistencies are
an almost universal problem. As most of the literature before, we read our
individual-based cross-method correlations as (unsatisfactory) low.
While we have no clear means to determine which of the two methods is
the correct or superior one, we can evaluate in how far the desirable charac-
teristics mentioned in the beginning of the paper are met by the methods.
In the aggregate both methods allow for making statements about the over-
all risk attitude and we would conclude that the subject pool is on average
(moderately) risk averse. However, while both methods tell about the risk
attitude of a group of subjects, it seems difficult to reliably infer the risk at-
titude of an individual from the methods. Hence, given the desirable criteria
of a method from the perspective of a practitioner, both methods seem not
to meet more than the most basic ones, primarily allowing to make state-
ments about the general prevalence of risk attitudes in the population. This
is somewhat disappointing considering that risk aversion is essentially an
individual-based concept.
Our findings are particularly crucial from the perspective of a practi-
tioner for whom measuring risk attitudes is not the last step and ultimate
goal, but who would like to use this information for further analysis, for ex-
ample when quantifying the role of risk attitudes in decisions where risk and
other elements determine outcomes jointly. Without individual consistency
of decisions, it is questionable to what extent HL (or AH) can be used as
measures of control for risk aversion, as it is sometimes done when inter-
preting other experimental games. We would, for example, now be more
careful when using them as a stable measure for individual risk attitudes in
experiments trying to take out the risk aspect of other decisions and using
experimental results on risk attitudes as indicators of whether individuals are
20
risk avers, risk neutral or risk seeking (e.g. in public good decisions (Gan-
gadharan and Nemes, 2009), trusting decisions (Houser et al., 2010) or when
linking them to genetic data (Zhong et al., 2009)).20 However, it would be
very useful having such a tool.
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